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Abstract 
In their fight against terrorism, modern states seem to install a permanent state of exception. 
This chapter focuses on the role that notions connected to the Rule of Law play in key 
speeches delivered by two political leaders who had to defend exceptional measures in 
reaction to terrorist actions and threats: the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the 
current Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Zapatero. The central research question are as 
follows: How are the anti-terror measures justified in the speeches at hand? Are they, legally 
speaking, created ‘from nowhere’, or are they still related in some way to positive law?  
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1.   War of the Words 
 
The so-called ‘war on terror’ is being waged not only with weapons and intelligence but (and 
perhaps to an even greater extent) with words. Political leaders who are successful at 
manipulating linguistic symbols are able to mobilize popular support for their cause and to 
legitimize their actions (Edelman 1967). Pursuing a war requires some sort of shared 
understanding of who is to be considered a friend and who is to be considered an enemy and 
how the war should be waged. Generally speaking, the ‘war on terror’ is being fought on 
behalf of ‘us’ – people living in the ‘free world’ – and directed against ‘them’ – an 
unspecified group of ‘terrorists’, presumably of a fundamentalist Islamic persuasion. Because 
states belonging to the ‘free world’ in general are dedicated to the Rule of Law in one way or 
another, they are not completely free in their selection of means. Unlike ‘terrorists’ who may 
do whatever they like to spread terror on a global scale, political leaders in the West can act 
and react only with caution, as if their hands were tied (as the popular comparison goes). 
Nonetheless, they are increasingly resorting to measures that their critics (such as Chomsky 
2006) consider to be at odds with fundamental principles of the Rule of Law. Here lies the 
greatest challenge for political rhetoric in our times: how is it possible to justify measures that 
apparently contradict everything ‘we’ stand for and believe in?  
In their fight against terrorism, modern states seem to install a permanent state of 
exception. Special competencies are being created that allow the authorities involved to 
violate fundamental rights, such as habeas corpus and the freedom of speech, for an 
unspecified period of time. Agamben (2005, p. 6 and 50-51) denies that the state of exception 
is a “state of law”; instead it is an “emptiness of law,” a space “without” or “devoid of law,” 
in which nothing but a fictitious relation with the previously existing legal order can be 
established. Whereas, in the past, the state of exception was intended to restore normalcy, 
governments currently seem to be maintaining a state of exception on a permanent basis. 
Especially with the institutionalization of abortion and euthanasia and the declaration of a 
global war on terrorism, the “juridically empty” space of the state of exception threatens to 
“coincide with the normal order.” The state of exception has been permanently 
institutionalized; the exception becomes the rule.  
 In our chapter, we will examine the role that notions connected to the Rule of Law 
play in key speeches delivered by two political leaders who had to defend exceptional 
measures in reaction to terrorist actions and threats: the former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair and the current Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Zapatero. We have chosen to focus 
on these two political leaders, because they both represent countries with longtime 
experiences with terrorism – IRA and ETA – and, moreover, they employ in their speeches 
two opposing rhetorical strategies: while Blair argues that exceptional times call for 
exceptional measures, Zapatero denies that there is anything extraordinary about his anti-
terrorism approach.1 In the speeches selected2 the two leaders react on crucial political events 
during their leadership: the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 
September 2001, the attack on a train station in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the London 
bombings on 7 July 2005. Our central research question are as follows: How are the anti-
terror measures justified in the speeches at hand? Are they, legally speaking, created ‘from 
nowhere’, as Agamben (following Schmitt 1996a) would claim, or are they still related in 
some way to positive law? In section 2 and 3 we will analyze the rhetorical devices that Blair 
and Zapatero respectively use in order to justify exceptional measures that seem at odds with 
the Rule of Law. In this rhetorical analysis we explore two questions: How are ‘friends’ 
differentiated from ‘enemies’? What role, if any, do notions related to the Rule of Law in 
defending the measures at hand? In section 4 the two opposing rhetorical strategies will be 
compared and evaluated.  
 
 
2. Blair’s Rhetoric of Exception  
 
For Blair, 9/11 was a turning point both in the history of humanity and in his personal history 
as a leader. In a religious vein, he acknowledges that this attack, “without parallel in the 
bloody history of terrorism,” made him see his true vocation: “September 11th was for me a 
revelation” (speech 4). What was revealed to him, was his political mission as a world’s 
leader: “I feel a most urgent sense of mission about today’s world” (speech 3). His mission is 
to “re-order this world around us” (speech 1) or, more precisely, to restore the world’s order: 
“The global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it” (speech 
4). The world’s security is at stake, ‘our’ life as well as ‘our’ way of life. 
Blair, a true champion of inclusive speech, frequently invokes a ‘we’. In different 
contexts this sign may denote different entities. As the Prime Minister of the UK at the time 
                                                            
1 This chapter is part of a series of articles on the rhetoric of exception. In subsequent articles we will analyze by 
other political leaders, including former US President George W. Bush and current US President Barack Obama. 
2 A list of the speeches can be found in the appendix. We have also used a number of statements and interviews 
as an additional source of information (although we do not refer to them as such in the text). We have translated 
Zapatero’s statements into English.   
representing the country he was obviously authorized to speak on behalf of the British people 
and he often did so. In speeches delivered after the London bombings, ‘we’ refers in particular 
to the authorities involved in tracking down and prosecuting the offenders: “We will pursue 
those responsible, not just the perpetrators but the planners of this outrage, wherever they are, 
and we will not rest until they are identified, and as far is humanly possible, brought to 
justice” (speech 5). In his speech to the US Congress, the word ‘we’ functions as a sign of 
solidarity with the American people after 9/11: “And our job, my nation that watched you 
grow, that you fought alongside and now fights alongside you, that takes enormous pride in 
our alliance and great affection in our common bond, our job is to be there with you” (speech 
3; italics added). Here, ‘we’ obviously refers to the alliance of British and American people 
who stand united in their fight against terrorism (as they once stood united against fascism).  
In many cases, ‘we’ is used to denote an even wider circle of people: nothing less than 
“the entire international community” (speech 7C). People building this ‘we’ are not restricted 
to a certain space (e.g., the Western part of the world); they are defined by the sharing of a 
particular set of convictions: “‘We’ is not the West. ‘We’ are as much Muslim as Christian or 
Jew or Hindu. ‘We’ are those who believe in religious tolerance, openness to others, to 
democracy, liberty and human rights administered by secular courts” (speech 7A). ‘We’ 
cherish freedom and democracy. Moreover, ‘we’ are tolerant toward people who think 
differently: “We are open societies. We feel enriched by diversity. We welcome dynamism 
and are tolerant of difference” (speech 7B). ‘We’ are not aggressive at all: “We are peaceful 
people” (speech 2). People like ‘us’ can also be found in the Arab and Muslim world: 
 
Across the Arab and Muslim world such a struggle for democracy and liberty continues. . . .  [We must] 
stand up for and not walk away from those engaged in a life or death battle for freedom . . . many 
Muslims, millions of them the world over, including Europe, who want what we all want: to be 
ourselves free and for others to be free also; who regard tolerance as a virtue and respect for faith of 
others as part of our own faith. (Speech 7A.) 
 
According to Blair, “these are the true voices of Muslims and Arab people” (speech 7C). 
‘They’ are not our enemy but our friend in the fight for freedom and democracy. 
However, as inclusion always implies exclusion (cf. Lindahl 2004), not everyone in the “the 
entire international community” is ‘our’ friend. Just as there are friends outside the 
international community stricto sensu – ‘they’ who are like ‘us’, “our” peers in the Arab and 
Muslim world –, there are people who support the enemy inside this community by defending 
a “policy of benign inactivity” (speech 7A): “It is a posture of weakness, defeatism and most 
of all, deeply insulting to every Muslim who believes in freedom of the majority. Instead of 
challenging the extremism, this attitude panders to it and therefore instead of choking it, feeds 
its growth” (speech 7A). Fellow-citizens who are critical of the current American and 
European approach to terrorism, are (perhaps willy-nilly) contributing to the country’s 
destruction: “[Anti-Americanism or Euro-scepticism] are the surest route to the destruction of 
our true national interest” (speech 8). According to Blair, these “false friends” are siding with 
the enemy: “The problem we have is that a part of opinion in our own countries agrees with 
them” (speech 7B). ‘They’, the “real” enemy, are the “terrorists”, also referred to as “religious 
fanatics” (e.g., in speech 1) or “extremists” (speech 3). “They” are a new kind of enemy 
without precedent in history: “In this century, a new and unconventional enemy has appeared: 
a global terrorism, based on a thoroughly warped misinterpretation of Islam, which is 
fanatical and deadly” (speech 8). In apparent contrast to conventional terrorist groups in 
Europe such as the IRA or the ETA, new Islamic terrorist groups not only aims at spreading 
insecurity but also in killing people for its own sake  (cf. Mendes 2008, p. 17). This “new and 
unconventional” enemy is described as bloodthirsty, barbarous and boundless: “These fanatics 
who will stop at absolutely nothing to cause death and destruction on a mass scale” (speech 
4).  ‘They’ hate ‘us’ and everything ‘we’ and ‘our’ peers stand for: “They disagree with our 
way of life, our values and in particular our tolerance. They hate us but probably hate those 
Muslims who believe in tolerance, even more, as apostates betraying the true faith.” (speech 
7C). The terrorist’s aim is to spread discord and destruction: “Its purpose is now plain: to 
provoke civil war” (Speech 8). In short, the enemy endorses an “evil ideology” (speech 6) and 
is prepared “to bring about Armageddon” (speech 4). Therefore, the possibility of 
compromise or communication between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is excluded altogether: “There is no 
compromise possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with 
such terror” (Speech 1). 
In Blair’s view, the differentiation between friends and enemies ultimately boils down, 
less to a clash of civilisations than to a “clash about civilisation” (speech 7A; italics added). It 
is a “clash between extremism and progress”, “a life and death battle for freedom”, “a battle 
about modernity” and “a battle of values and progress” (speech 7A.). Terrorism is perceived 
as an existential threat to the modern way of life and its liberal and hedonistic values. 
According to Blair, “all civilised people, Muslim or other, feel revulsion at it” (speech 6). By 
implication, terrorists are banned from civilization, the “entire international community” and 
probably – as agents of “evil”3  – from humanity as well.4   
In order to justify the extraordinary measures to be taken against terrorism, Blair 
resorts to roughly two different types of discourse: on the one hand a discourse of exception in 
which he argues that an exceptional threat requires an exceptional response and a discourse of 
normalcy in which he states that, although the threat is exceptional, the response remains 
safely within the ‘ordinary’ boundaries of custom, morality and the Rule of Law (and, if it 
does not, these boundaries must be stretched somewhat to make it fit).  Drawing on the 
discourse of exception, Blair claims that ‘we’ are facing a “new type of war”5 that “will rest 
on intelligence to a greater degree than ever before. It will rest on intelligence to a greater 
degree than ever before. It demands a different attitude to our own interests. It forces us to act 
even when so many comforts seem unaffected, and the threat so far off, if not illusory” 
(speech 4). The exceptional threat – apparently distant but nevertheless “real and existential” 
(ibid.) – requires ‘us’ “to be prepared to think sooner and act quicker” if ‘we’ want to defend 
‘our’ values. What is needed is “progressive pre-emption” (speech 7C). ‘We’ have no other 
choice than to fight: “We can no more opt out of this struggle than we can opt out of the 
climate changing around us” (speech 7A). “If we want to secure our way of life, there is no 
alternative but to fight for it” (speech 7B). Blair compares terrorism to a virus: “The virus is 
terrorism whose intent to inflict destruction is unconstrained by human feeling and whose 
capacity to inflict it is enlarged by technology” (speech 3). If ‘we’ do not stop this virus, the 
result will be disorder: “Our new world rests on order. The danger is disorder. And in today’s 
world, it can now spread like contagion” (speech 3). It is ‘our’ duty to act: “The global threat 
to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it” (speech 4). Everything ‘we’ 
can do to avert the threat, ‘we’ must do: “We should take what security measures we can” 
(speech 6).  
Despite his frequent invocations of  a ‘we’, it is clear that, in crucial moments, Blair is 
primarily thinking of himself – in his capacity as Prime Minister of the UK and one of the 
world’s leaders – as the one who must act, while others may “err on the side of caution” 
(speech 4). In defence of his decision to go to war in Iraq, Blair argues that it is the task of 
leadership to expose and fight the global threat of terrorism. He acknowledges that the 
                                                            
3 The theme of ‘evil’ is even more present in speeches by US President Bush (see Mral 2004, p. 20–22). 
4 As Schmitt (1996a, p. 37) notices, an intensification of the friend-enemy distinction may  be lead to pleas for 
the “endgültig letzten Krieg der Menschheit” (that is, the “absolute last war of humanity”, Schmitt 1996b, p. 36). 
5 In contrast to Bush (see Mral 2004, p. 17–20), Blair rarely uses the expression ‘war’ and never speaks of a ‘war 
on terror’, but prefers seemingly softer notions like a ‘battle’ or a ‘fight’ against terrorism. 
invasion in Iraq stirs “bitter emotions” in his own country and may be “ill-fitting the pre-
occupations of the man and woman on the street” (ibid.). This does not, however, prevent him 
from taking the measures he deems necessary, building on his own judgment. By taking the 
decision to participate in Iraq’s invasion, Blair puts an end to a potential endless deliberation 
in an authoritarian and authoritative manner: 
 
Prime Ministers don’t have the luxury of maintaining both sides of the argument. They can see both 
sides. But, ultimately, leadership is about deciding . . . Do we want to take the risk? That is the 
judgment. And my judgment then and now is that the risk of this new global terrorism and its 
interaction with states or organisations or individuals proliferating WMD [Weapons of Mass 
Destruction], is one I simply am not prepared to run. (Ibid.) 
 
In addition to appealing to his leadership and personal judgment as a last resort (“ultimately”), 
Blair persistently tries to gain a broad support for his decisions by using the discourse of 
normalcy. In defending his anti-terror approach, he draws his main arguments from both 
shared ideals and shared interests in order to create “a happy marriage of conviction and 
Realpolitik” is created  (speech 8). As a matter of fact, Blair states that ‘we’ have a shared 
interest in the world’s orderliness in particular for economic reasons: “All of us have an 
interest in stability and a fear of chaos. That’s the impact of interdependence” (speech 7C). 
Here, British self-interest collides with the world’s general interest. Therefore, ‘we’ have to 
fight terrorism collectively on a global scale and take away the causes of its growth, such as 
poverty and inequality. Moreover, as Blair would argue soon after 9/11 (speech 1), it is ‘our’ 
“moral duty” to fight for the values in which ‘we’ believe, especially freedom and justice: “So 
I believe this is a fight for freedom. And I want to make it a fight for justice too. Justice not 
only to punish the guilty. But justice to bring those same values of democracy and freedom to 
people round the world”. In a communitarian vein,6 Blair argues that the “power of 
community” should be combined with justice in order to become a “moral power”. In his 
view, justice consists of “fairness and people of equal worth . . . but also reason and 
tolerance”. These values are not specifically Western as some opponents have claimed, but 
are endorsed by the whole of humanity:  “Ours are not Western values, they are universal 
values of the human spirit. And anywhere . . . the choice is the same: freedom not tyranny; 
democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law; not the secret police” (speech 3). The best way to 
defend ‘our’ security is to spread these universal values all over the world (speech 4). “The 
only way to win is: (...) to defeat it by values and ideas set in opposition to those of the 
terrorists” (speech 7A). In other words: 
 
To win, we have to win the battle of values, as much as arms. We have to show these are not Western 
still les American or Anglo-Saxon values but values in the common ownership of humanity, universal 
values that should be the right of the global citizen. (Speech 7B) 
 
The quotation above marks the transition from the moral to the legal sphere: universal 
values, such as freedom and justice, should be “the right of the global citizen” (italics added). 
By using a normative phrase (“should be”), Blair acknowledges explicitly that citizens 
worldwide are not, or not yet, legally entitled to these fundamental values. In other passages, 
however, he makes it appear as if these values are already law: “We are fighting for the 
inalienable right of humankind – black or white, Christian or not, left, right or a million 
different – to be free (...)” (speech 3). Particularly in his defence of the invasion of Iraq, Blair 
displays an ambivalent stance towards the law. On the one hand, he claims that the invasion is 
in full accordance with the right of self-defence, as granted by international law:  
                                                            
6 Whether New Labour under Blair really reflected, or was influenced by, communitarian thought is debatable 
(see MacMillan 2007). 
 
The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values. But we cannot advance these values 
except within a framework that recognises their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs a global 
response, based on global rules. The essence of a community is common rights and responsibilities. If 
we are threatened, we have a right to act. And we do not accept in a community that others have a right 
to oppress and brutalise their people. We value the freedom and dignity of the human race and each 
individual in it. (...) Emphatically I am not saying that every situation leads to military action. But we 
surely have a duty and a right to prevent the threat materialising; and we surely have a responsibility to 
act when a nation’s people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam’s. (Speech 4.) 
 
Blair further argues that Iraq contravened UN resolution nr. 1441. It was, therefore, the UK’s 
duty to intervene: “We had to force conformity with international obligations that for years 
had been breached with the world turning a blind eye” (ibid.). “Our primary purpose was to 
enforce UN resolutions over Iraq and WMD” (ibid.).  
 On the other hand, Blair pleas for amending the existing international law in order to 
provide for a legal justification of interventions like this. He claims that “the rule book of 
international politics has been torn up”: 
 
Interdependence – the fact of a crisis somewhere becoming a crisis everywhere – makes a mockery of 
traditional views of national interest. (...) [These challenges] can only be effectively tackled together. 
And they require a pre-emptive and not simply reactive response. (...) What is more such action will 
often require intervention, far beyond our own boundaries. (...) What this means is that we have to act, 
not react; we have to do so on the basis of prediction not certainty (...). And what all that means is: that 
this can’t be done easily unless it is done on an agreed basis of principle, of values that are shared and 
fair. (Speech 7C.) 
 
According to Blair, the basic problem of existing international law is that it does not sanction 
a pre-emptive response: 
 
It may well be that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can systematically 
brutalise and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, diplomacy and even 
sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 
remains in mass graves already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a 
catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be? (Speech 4; italics added.)  
 
In his view, therefore, the United Nations have to be reformed: “It means reforming the UN 
so its Security Council represents 21st century reality; and giving the UN the capability to act 
effectively as well as debate” (ibid.). “The Security Council should be reformed. We need a 
new international regime on the non-proliferation of WMD” (speech 3). 
When confronted with legal objections to his course of action, Blair responds by 
referring to the allegedly political bias of his critics: “The lawyers continue to divide over it – 
with their legal opinions bearing a remarkable similarity to their political view of the war” 
(speech 4). The cause seems to justify the means: “It is a cause that has none of the debatable 
nature of the decisions to go for regime change; it is an entirely noble one – to help people in 
need of our help in pursuit of liberty; and a self-interested one, since in their salvation lies 
own security” (speech 7). Here we find again (as earlier in this section) an allusion to “a 
happy marriage of conviction and Realpolitik”: by liberating other people, ‘we’ protect ‘our’ 
own security. 
 
 
3.  Zapatero’s Rhetoric of Normalcy  
In contrast to Blair, Zapatero was not in charge when the 9/11 terrorist attacks took place. At 
that time he was leader of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), the main party of the 
opposition, while José María Aznar was Prime Minister of the Spanish government. Zapatero 
took office after (and to some extent because of) the terrorist attacks in 2004. He benefited 
from his promise of ending Spain’s support for Bush’s ‘war on terror’ and withdrawing 
Spanish troops from Iraq. 
 Like Blair, Zapatero often makes use of inclusive speech. He uses a collective ‘we’ to 
refer to the government over which he presides: the people of Spain, the democratic western 
citizens, all the civilized people (in contrast to terrorist and terrorist supporters). When 
addressing the Spanish people, Zapatero portrays his government as one in which “no one 
feels excluded”:  
[A government that] listens to and pays attention to [citizens]; that always explains the reason of every 
decision adopted. It will be a Government who respects citizens, listens to their voices and criticisms no 
matter how hard they are. (Speech 13.)  
 
This openness to dialogue exists only among ‘us’, the Spanish society, “a tolerant, non-
clerical, educated and developed society as it should be ours” (ibid.). Whereas ‘we’ are 
‘civilized’, ‘they’, the terrorists, represent the negation of everything we stand for:  
[T]errorism is, in my opinion, the negation of democracy, terrorism is the negation of progress, terrorism 
is the negation of freedom, terrorism is the negation of speech which has made human being, the society 
and the civilization stronger. (speech 14.) 
 
Terrorists are thus excluded from the ‘we’, as it is not possible to reach a consensus with 
‘them’. ‘They’ are not rational:  
[T]here is no reason in terrorism; there is no sense in terrorism; there is no politics in terrorism. There is 
only terror, death, blackmail. There is only the will to control, to subjugate, to destroy the morality of 
men, to eliminate their convictions. (Speech 13.)  
 
The open dialogue for which Zapatero pleads is meant to take place only among ‘us’, the 
democratic people seeking unity. According to him, “the unity of democrats is the 
fundamental element in the fight against terrorism” (ibid.). As a member of the opposition, he 
tried to achieve when he proposed the ‘Pact of freedoms and against terrorism’ on the 
following ground: “United, we are could beat terrorism. And that union is one of the most 
efficient weapons for achieving that goal” (speech 17). 
From the very beginning Zapatero has tried to face international terrorist issues with this 
strategy of dialogue. Zapatero’s ‘major’ project was thus the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’: a 
‘forum’ inside the UN structure to promote a dialogue among different civilizations opposed 
to the ‘clash of civilizations’ announced by some American intellectuals. This forum allowed 
drawing a new line between the ‘civilized’ Arab world and Islamic terrorist groups (e.g., Al 
Qaeda) and governments who supported them. According to Zapatero, these terrorist groups 
represent “international” instead of “Islamic terrorism”.  He considers it to be a “great 
mistake” towards people of the Muslim faith that the adjective ‘islamic’ is used to refer to a 
kind of terrorism (speech 14).  Terrorist groups “do neither deserve to be recognised as 
followers of either a religion (...), a nation or the people” (ibid.) They are nothing but a group 
of “fanatics who are prepared to kill in order to impose their madness through force, ready to 
disseminate the seed of evil” (speech 15). 
Despite his exclusionary rhetoric, Zapatero did occasionally open the dialogue with 
the armed Basque separatist movement ETA. From the very beginning of his presidency he 
was engaged in an ambivalent process of negotiation. While the Spanish judiciary power had 
banned several political parties, NGOs and other social organizations that had ties with the 
Basque Separatists, a group of international negotiators who had tried to reach a peaceful 
solution with Zapatero’s approval. After ETA broke the cease-fire period in December 2006, 
however, Zapatero declared that “there will be no dialogue” (speech 20), thus definitively 
excluding the ETA from the possibility of becoming a part of ‘us’. 
 After having won the elections in 2004, Zapatero offered a speech of rational dialogue 
in reaction against his predecessor Aznar, who had supported Bush’s military interventions. 
Zapatero argued for counter-terrorism policies with respect for the Rule of Law and human 
rights. This respect is unconditional because:  
no democratic conviction will be put under question by terrorism actions, nor democratic law will be 
changed because of terrorist actions,  no democratic practice will be altered because we are in combat 
against terrorism. (Speech 14.) 
 
In the international sphere this commitment to legality implies that  
Spain will assume the international obligations that corresponds to it in the defence of peace and security. 
Spain will always have one simple requirement: a previous decision of the United Nations or from any 
other organisation with multinational character. (Speech 13.)  
 
Despite his retirement of Spanish troops from Iraq, Zapatero has kept Spanish troops in 
Afghanistan, and he has even increased the amount of military power. 
In the domestic sphere Basque terrorism is being fought through “the activity of State 
Security Forces and Justice and (…) by the loss of social support to violence” (speech 20). An 
important consequence of this strategy is that since 2002 five Basque political parties – 
supposed to be linked with ETA – have been banned.7  
One major feature of Zapatero’s anti-terrorism policy is his belief in its legal 
foundation. He points out that “the response can come only from the law. That is to say, the 
response can come only from democracy” (speech 14). However, despite Zapatero’s repeated 
references to the Rule of Law in Spain, denouncements of human-rights violations in the fight 
against terrorism have been launced by the Basque human rights NGOs as well as by such 
prestigious international NGOs as Amnesty International8 and Human Rights Watch,9 in 
addition to theUnited Nations Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Theo Van Boven and Manfred 
Nowak.10 
                                                            
7 These parties represent 15% of the electorate, with approximately 150,000 votes. If the assumption that those 
parties ‘are’ part of ETA is correct, this organization has an important base of support among the Basque 
population. 
8 See Amnesty International Report 2008 available at: http://thereport.amnesty.org/document/101. 
9 Human Rights Watch report “Setting an Example? Counter-Terrorism Measures in Spain”, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/01/26/setting-example. 
10 United Nations Special Report on Torture after visiting Spain in October 2003, available at:  
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/107/16/PDF/G0410716.pdf?OpenElement. Follow-up report 
2006 by Special Rapporteur Manfred Nowak, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/119/12/PDF/G0611912.pdf?OpenElement. 
At first glance, Zapatero’s claim to act in accordance with the Rule of Law seems to 
contradict the reports on human rights violations by the Spanish government. In addition to 
recognizing the state of exception as most constitutions do, however, the Spanish Constitution 
also regulates a permanent exception with regard to terrorism issues in Article 55 II. This 
article regulates limitations to fundamental rights Ie.g., longer periods of arrest, 
incommunicado detentions, the possibility of intercepting a suspect’s correspondence or any 
other communication and entering in any building without a search warrant in the prosecution 
of individuals in relation to investigations of terrorist crimes). From the very beginning of its 
democracy, Spain maid provisions that allowed for exceptional measures and these 
constitutional restrictions were regulated in special anti-terrorism acts. In the process of 
normalizing the exception in 1988 anti-terrorism acts were promulgated and their provisions 
were included in the ‘normal’ legislation, the Criminal Code and Procedure Criminal Law. 
The rulings of judges applying legal norms which were originally exceptional measures are 
now regarded as ‘normal’.  
Furthermore, the exception is institutionalized by the modification of the law and its 
interpretation. A paradigmatic example is the banning of political parties linked with terrorist 
organization ETA. The Spanish Constitution allows the banning of organizations – and 
political parties fall into this category – only when they are catalysts of criminal activities.  
So, the law which regulated political parties required a criminal sentence previous to the 
banning. Since 1998 there was an outgoing criminal investigation on the links between 
Batasuna – a Basque radical separatist political party –  and ETA. However, the investigation 
advanced slowly. As a consequence of Zapatero’s Pact of freedoms and against terrorism 
(see above), a new Act for regulating political parties was accepted. The Act introduced 
several new grounds on which political parties could be banned. It contravened the Spanish 
constitution, because it made it possible to ban a political party on the sheer basis of a 
‘suspicion’ that the party at hand supports terrorist groups. The Act also introduced a new 
procedure for banning of political parties with less legal safeguards. For instance, no longer a 
previous criminal sentence was required.  
In 2002, after the promulgation of the Act, the judge responsible for the old outgoing 
criminal investigation, finally decided to suspend all Batsuna activities. This clearly 
demonstrates the political dimension of the law enforcement. About this process of banning 
Basque political parties Zapatero says that “[t]he prosecutors present their accusations based 
on their opinion, their legal understanding and their professionalism” (speech 18). Moreover, 
he claims that his government is only responsible to “appoint the State General Prosecutor 
and to indicate a criminal policy to follow. What are the basic objectives of that criminal 
policy? Evidently: to fight against terrorism” (ibid.). Although Zapatero tried to present 
counter terrorism measures as objective law enforcement with a minimum of political 
influence, under his leadership legislation has been introduced that contravenes fundamental 
constitutional rights. Consequently, even when formal rule of law is maintained the substance 
of law is modified or re-interpreted according political needs.  
Zapatero’s  rhetoric based on the rule of law is reinforced with militant arguments 
based on democracy. As a result, it is not only the rule of law but in fact democracy itself 
what is at stake in the fight against terrorism: “[N]obody in a democracy can engage in the 
political life and the institutions representing acronyms [implying ETA] that imply a lack of 
respect to democratic values”(speech 21). And people who do not respect that are banned “in 
defence of a democratically ordered system of values such as freedom and security” (ibid.). 
 Another example that shows the underlying political interests of Zapatero’s “legal’ 
strategy is his response to the criticism he received due to the treatment of a former Basque 
terrorist leader De Juana Chaos. De Juana Chaos was found guilty of various terrorist crimes 
and condemned to prison. According to the Spanish Prison Law, in 2006 he had the right to 
finish the rest of his sentence under the regime of parole. However, a powerful NGO, named 
Asociación Víctimas del Terrorismo (Terrorism Victims Association), and the Partido 
Popular (PP) pressured the government to keep De Juana Chaos in prison on the ground that 
he had not publicly expressed repentance. Pushed by public opinion, Zapatero’s government 
solved the problem by presenting new accusations against him in the same month he was 
meant to leave prison on parole. The State prosecutor accused De Juana Chaos of committing 
apology of terrorism in two articles which he had written a month before in a Basque 
newspaper. Facing a possible new sentence of 96 years of prison, De Juana Chaos started a 
hunger strike in protest against these accusations. At that time ETA was under the cease-fire 
and in negotiations with the Spanish Government. Within this political context the accusation 
of the Prosecutor changed from 96 to 3 years. De Juana Chaos continued remained at the 
centre of the polemics between the government and the opposition party, since his hunger 
strike forced the government to let him recover in a hospital in the Basque Country against the 
policy of preventing Basque terrorist criminals to serve their sentences in the Basque territory. 
Zapatero was severely criticized because these measures were considered a surrender to 
terrorist demands. He defended himself by saying that this was just the ‘enforcement of the 
law’. However, being tired of the criticism he received by the PP he said that during the 
“former Government they reduced his sentence with one year for writing a book that glorifies 
terrorism” (speech 18). During his government Zapatero nonetheless claims: “for writing one 
or two articles where he does the same he receives three years of prison” (ibid.).  
As a result, Zapatero overall rhetorical strategy aims to portray the fight against 
terrorism as nothing else than ‘just’ law enforcement. However, exceptional measures 
normalised in the Spanish Constitution including incommunicado detentions, the banning of 
Basque political parties and the treatment of De Juana Chaos’ hunger strike  contradicts this 
Zapatero’s normalcy portray of Spanish fight against terrorism. 
 
4.  Words Don’t Come Easy 
Both Spain and the UK have a long time experience with terror originating from inside of 
their own political systems. Under Zapatero, however, Spain took another route than the one 
taken by theBritish government under Blair. Zapatero departed from Aznar’s and Blair’s 
course of following the United States and their ‘coalition of the willing’ in fighting 
international forms of terrorism. In response to the growing criticism of the US anti-terrorism 
policy Zapatero altered his stance and adapted his rhetoric accordingly, and he became a 
‘strong’ defender of the Rule of Law. This obviously had to do with the mandate that he 
received in the 2004 election. Apparently of even greater importance is the change of 
perspective: Zapatero took the opportunity to combine the problems of national and 
international terrorism and focused on the first. In this respect, he did not need to declare the 
‘state of exception’ like Blair in order to execute special measures, simply because Spain has 
preserved the exception in terrorist issues since the time of Franco.  
Whereas Blair used the rhetoric of exception sustained by moral and political 
arguments in order to justify his policy while mobilizing consent and support for it at the 
same time, Zapatero normalized the exception by paying respect to internationally 
acknowledged standards of the Rule of Law. Both political leaders were masterful in 
managing the discourse of inclusive speech, albeit for different purposes: Blair tried to build a 
consensus for a state of exception allowing to introduce a just cause reasoning into the 
international law. Zapatero used an existing consensus (about the Rule of Law) to broaden the 
consensus for his way of dealing with the problem of national terrorism in Spain.  
In hindsight, these rhetorical strategies ultimately proved unpersuasive: the British 
people were growing increasingly dissatisfied with Blair’s agenda of supporting the United 
States in their fight against terrorism (as clearly demonstrated by his steady decline in 
popularity11), and there was a increasing lack of support in Spain (with the exception of the 
Basque country) for re-opening negotiations with the ETA, after Zapatero’s earlier attempts 
failed.12 These rhetorical failures were primarily due to the ‘logic’ of symbolic power. If the 
inclusive speech that both leaders used in the wake of terrorist attacks is contradicted by an 
eroding consensus, the weakness of symbolic power becomes apparent. To be sure, inclusive 
speech is an essential element of political rhetoric in general. Its exploitation by Blair and 
Zapatero was therefore nothing exceptional. Instead, it was the exception – the exceptional 
threat of terrorism – that enabled both leaders to use the anti-terror consent of the people for 
their own purposes, to fight terrorism either on a global scale (Blair) or at home (Zapatero). 
Nonetheless, this process of consensus-building proved fragile. Critics soon reclaimed the 
stage and redefined the battle field: in Blair’s case they demanded a return to a state of 
normalcy where the Rule of Law holds sway. In Zapatero’s case, however, they dismantled 
his attempt to normalize the exception. It seems that, whenever there is a critical auditorium, 
symbolic power based on inclusive speech is itself an exception. Although it may be 
persuasive for a while, it will never last. 
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